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JURISDICTION

This appeal is an appeal from the district court review of an adjudicative proceeding
of a political subdivision of the state and the Court of Appeals has appellate
jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(b)(l).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Is the 1996 District Court case res judicata with respect to the issues

presented in the 1998 District Court case brought by the Petitioners against the
Respondent?
Standard of Review: This issue presents a question of law, and is therefore
reviewable for correction of error.

Wimgar v. Froerer Corp., 813 P. 2d 104, 107-08

(Utah 1991).
This issue was preserved for appeal in the memoranda and argument
presented at the hearing of the cross motions for summary judgment (R. 17-139; 142246; 247-257; 258-281).
2. Are the Petitioners entitled to non-conforming use status with respect to
their real properties utilized as short-term rentals prior to the issuance of a cease and
desist order by the Respondent Sandy City Corporation in 1996?
Standard of Review: This is a challenge to a summary judgment presenting
for review conclusions of law only and the appellate court reviews those conclusions
for correctness, without according deference to the trial court's legal conclusions.
Bonham v. Morgan, 788 P. 2d 497 (Utah 1989).

This issue was preserved for appeal in the memoranda and argument
presented at the hearing of the cross motions for summary judgment. (R. 17-139;
142-246; 247-257; 258-281).

DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS OF LAW
The following provisions of law may be determinative of the issues herein,
and are set out in their entirety in the addendum:
Chapter 15-24 Sandy City Development Code
STATEMENT OF T H E CASE
This is an action by John Collins and June Collins against the Sandy City
Board of Adjustment and Sandy City Corporation for review of a decision by the
Sandy City Board of Adjustment denying non-conforming use status for certain real
properties located in Sandy City owned by John and June Collins that had been
utilized as short-term rentals prior to the enactment by Sandy City of an ordinance
prohibiting such short-term rentals.
On October 27, 1998 the Petitioners John and June Collins filed an
application for non-conforming use status with the Sandy City Board of Adjustment.
This application was denied on November 12, 1998. The Petitioners filed a Petition
for Review on December 11, 1998. (R. 1-6) Cross motions for summary judgment
were subsequently filed (R. 15-16; 140-141) and the Motions were argued on August
16,1999. (R. 431)

The District Court granted the Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment and
denied the Petitioners' Motion. (R. 446-448; Add. 1-3 ) Petitioners filed this appeal
on December 16,1999. (R. 449-450 ).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Petitioners are the owners of certain real properties located within the
boundaries of Sandy City. For a lengthy period of time prior to March, 1996, the
Petitioners utilized the properties as short-term rental properties, sometimes referred
to as "ski rentals". In March, 1996 the respondent Sandy City Corporation issued a
cease and desist order requiring the petitioners to cease using the properties for that
purpose.

(R. 28 ) Sandy City did not at that time pass an ordinance prohibiting

short-term rentals but relied instead on the existing ordinance, arguing that such use
was already prohibited.
The Petitioners filed an appeal to the respondent Sandy City Board of
Adjustment in 1996, which upheld Sandy City's interpretation of the Sandy zoning
ordinances to preclude such use by the petitioners. Petitioners appealed that decision
to the Third District Court and the District Court upheld the decision of the Sandy
City Board of Adjustment. [Third District Court Case No. 960905929CV] (R. 210)
On March 26, 1998 the Utah Court of Appeals rendered a decision in a case
involving precisely the same issues as those presented by the Petitioners herein in the
above-referenced 1996 case which was pending at the same time as the petitioners'
case, in Brown, et. al. vs. Sandy City Board of Adjustment; and Sandy, a political subdivision of
Utah, 957 P. 2d 207 (Utah App. 1998). That case, decided March 26, 1998, held that

Sandy City's interpretation of the Sandy City Development Code to prohibit leases of
less than thirty days in residential zones was not a correct interpretation, i.e., Sandy
City had no valid ordinance prohibiting short-term leases in Sandy City.

The

respondent Sandy City then imposed a temporary moratorium on short-term rentals
effective March 27, 1998 and subsequently enacted ordinances prohibiting short-term
leases. (R. 36-45)
On or about October 27, 1998, the petitioners filed an application for
determination of non-conforming status on their properties with the Sandy City
Board of Adjustment.

(R. 50)

That application was heard by the Board on

November 12, 1998. The Sandy City Board of Adjustment denied the petitioners'
application for determination of non-conforming use status on the petitioners'
properties, apparently relying on the 1996 District Court decision which denied the
Motion for Summary Judgment filed by John and June Collins and granted the
Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Sandy City Corporation.

(R. 446-448)

Petitioners filed a Petition for Review of that decision in Case No. 980912601 in the
Third District Court. On cross motions for summary judgment the District Court
ruled that because the Petitioners/Appellants had not appealed the prior order in
Third District Court Case No. 960905929CV, that case was res judicata in the present
case (Case No. 980912601) and precluded the Petitioners/Appellants from obtaining
non-conforming use status on the subject properties.

The District Court further

ruled that the Petitioners had not demonstrated that they were in fact using the

subject properties as short-term rentals on the date that Sandy City7 enacted its
ordinance prohibiting such use. (R 446-448; Add. 1-3 ).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
1. The decision of the District Court in the 1996 case does not constitute a
bar under principles of res judicata with respect to the Petitioners' application for nonconforming use status because the issues involved in the 1996 case and the 1998 case
are not identical, and there was an intervening change in the law that occurred when
the Court of Appeals decided Brown, et. al vs. Sandy City Board ofAdjustment; and Sandy,
a political subdivision of Utah, 957 P. 2d 207 (Utah App. 1998). This case became the
controlling law of the case and effectively established that Sandy City Corporation
had no valid ordinance prohibiting short-term rental properties when it issued a cease
and desist order requiring the Petitioners to terminate using their real properties
located in Sandy City for such purpose.
2. The Petitioners are entitled to non-conforming use status for the properties
owned by them in Sandy City and used as short-term rentals prior to the date of the
cease and desist order issued by Sandy City Corporation, regardless of the fact that
they were not using those properties as short-term rentals on the date Sandy City
enacted a moratorium or ordinance prohibiting such use.

Mr. and Mrs. Collins

complied with the cease and desist order in good faith and should not be penalized
for not violating that order.

i

ARGUMENT
A summary judgment may be affirmed only when there is no genuine issue of
material fact and the prevailing party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Utah
R. Civ. P. 56(c). In reviewing the judgment, this Court must "accept the facts and
inferences in the light most favorable to the losing party" and "may reconsider the
trial court's legal conclusions."

Winegar v. Froerer Corp., 813 P.2d 104, 107 (Utah

1991).
POINT I:

T H E DECISION OF T H E DISTRICT COURT IN T H E
1996 CASE IS N O T RES JUDICATA W[TH RESPECT
TO T H E ISSUES RAISED I N T H E PETITIONERS'
1998 DISTRICT COURT CASE.

A. The Issues in the 1996 Case and the 1998 Case Are Not Identical.
The doctrine of res judicata embraces both the law of claim preclusion and the
doctrine of collateral estoppel or "issue preclusion." In re Rights to Use of All Water,
982 P. 2d 65 (Utah 1999); Madsen vs. Borthick, 769 P. 2d 245, 247 (Utah 1988). A party
invoking the doctrine of collateral estoppel or issue preclusion must demonstrate that
the issue involved is identical to the issue decided in a previous action, that the issue
was decided in final judgment on the merits, that the issue was competently, fully, and
fairly litigated in the first action, and that the party against whom the doctrine is
invoked was either a party to the first action or in privity with a party to the first
action. Hill p. Seattle First Nat. Bank, 827 P. 2d 241 (Utah 1992). If any one of these
requirements is not satisfied, there can be no issue preclusion. Baxter v. Department of
Tramp., 705 P.2d 1167,1168 (Utah 1985); Wilde v. Mid-Century Ins. Co., 635 P. 2d
417,419 (Utah 1981).

In the instant case, while the latter three requirements are met, the issue is not
precisely the same as the issue in the 1996 case. In the 1996 case, the issue was
whether or not the Sandy City ordinances, as then constituted, prohibited leases of
dwellings within the boundaries of Sandy City for terms of less than thirty days. In
the 1998 case, the issue presented was whether the Petitioners were entitled to
recognition of non-conforming use status of their properties, based upon the fact
that Petitioners were in fact utilizing their properties as "ski rentals" prior to the
enactment of the Sandy City ordinance in March, 1998. These are not identical issues
and principles of issue preclusion do not apply.
B. The Doctrine of Collateral Estoppel Does Not Apply in This Case.
Even if the Court were to apply the principles of collateral estoppel or issue
preclusion to this case, examination of the issue does not end with the analysis set
forth in Hill v. Seattle First Nat Bank, supra. In the case of Norman v. Murray First
Thrift <&Loan Company, 596 P. 2d 1028 (Utah 1979), the Utah Supreme Court stated:
"To determine whether it is appropriate to apply collateral estoppel
necessitates three further inquiries: First, whether the issues presented
in the current litigation are in substance the same as resolved in the prior
litigation; second, whether the controllingfacts or legalprinciples have
changed significantly since the prior judgment [emphasis added]; third,
whether other special circumstances warrant an exception to the normal
rules of preclusion." At 1032.
The analysis enunciated in Norman v. Murray First Thrift & hoan Company,
supra, follows the general rule in the United States. In State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v.
Duel, 324 U.S. 154 (1945), the U.S. Supreme Court stated, "... [I]t is .. .the general rule
that res judicata is no defense where between the time of the first judgment and the

o

second there has been an intervening decision or a change in the law creating an
altered situation. 2 Freeman on judgments (5th ed. 1925)." At 162. Where the facts or
the law have substantially changed between the first judgment and the second
judgment, collateral estoppel is inapplicable. Statler v. Catalano, 293 111. App. 3d 483,
691 N.E.2d 384 (111. App. 1997); Community Hospital vs. Sullivan, 986 F. 2d 357, 360
(10th Or. 1993); Board of Education vs. Village ofNorthbrook, 692 N.E. 2d 1278 (111. App.
1 Dist. 1998); Farrow vs. Brown, 873 S.W. 2d 918 (Mo. App. 1994).
The Respondent maintains that because the Third District Court in the 1996
case granted summary judgment for Sandy City against John and June Collins,
essentially ruling that there was no issue as to any material fact and that Sandy City's
zoning ordinances, as then written, prohibited the leasing of property for terms less
than thirty days, as argued and advanced by Sandy City, that this precludes the
Petitioners from making application for non-conforming use status, notwithstanding
the fact that the Utah Court of Appeals ruled in Brown, et. al. vs. Sandy City Board of
Adjustment; and Sandy, a political subdivision of Utah, 957 P. 2d 207 (Utah App. 1998) that
Sandy City's interpretation of the Sandy City Development Code to prohibit leases of
less than thirty days in residential zones was erroneous and not a correct
interpretation of that Code. What Brown effectively held was that Sandy City had no
ordinance in effect that prohibited short-term leases, and that, therefore, such leases
were a valid use.
Taking the Respondent's position to its logical conclusion, this would mean
that the ordinances in question in the Brown case and in Petitioners' 1996 case could

in

not be relied upon by Sandy City to preclude any other property owner in Sandy City
from leasing their property for less than thirty days ( prior to the enactment of a legal
ordinance prohibiting such leases), except the Petitioners in this case, because Mr.
and Mrs. Collins chose to await the outcome of the Brown case, supra, rather than to
appeal. This is an illogical and incongruous result, and is not supported by the case
law. In Heslop v. Bank of Utah, 839 P.2d 828 (Utah 1992), the Court stated:
"In the vast majority of cases, the stated law of a decision
is effective both prospectively and retrospectively, even a
decision which overrules prior law." At 835.

In the instant case, a change in the intervening case law altered the situation
between the time of the first suit by petitioners in 1996 and the present case,
undertaken in 1998. Brown, supra, held that Sandy City could not prohibit short term
rentals pursuant to general language in its then existing development code regarding
the use of single family dwellings in residential zones in the city of Sandy. This
altered the law with respect to John and June Collins as well as any other property
owner living within the limits of Sandy City. In response to the decision in Brown,
supra, Sandy City passed a moratorium on short-term leases and ultimately passed an
ordinance prohibiting such leases within Sandy City. However, John and June Collins
were legally entitled to use their properties as short-term rentals prior to the passing
of that ordinance and that was the basis for their application for non-conforming use
status in November, 1998.

POINT II:

A.

T H E PETITIONERS ARE ENTITLED TO A GRANT
OF NON-CONFORMING USE STATUS FOR THEIR
PROPERTIES USED AS SHORT-TERM RENTALS
PRIOR TO T H E ISSUANCE OF T H E CEASE A N D
DESIST ORDER ISSUED BY RESPONDENT IN
MARCH OF 1996.

The Petitioners Were Using Their Properties for a Valid Use at the
Time They Were Ordered to Discontinue Such Use by Sandy City.
A nonconfonming land use is commonly defined as a lawful use maintained

after the effective date of a zoning ordinance prohibiting such use in the applicable
district. See 1 R. Anderson, American l^aw of Zoning 3d, §6.01, at 446-447 n. 2 (1986).
The doctrine of vested nonconforming uses is based on the reluctance of courts to
apply zoning ordinances retroactively, thus destroying vested property rights. Rotter v.
Coconino County, 818 P. 2d 704 (Ariz. 1991).
nonconforming

uses

solely

by virtue

of

its

Any ordinance that eliminates
enactment

is generally

held

unconstitutional as a taking of property without due process of law. O'Connor v. City
of Moscow, 202 P. 2d 401, 403-04 (Idaho 1949); Bergford v. Clackamas County, 515 P. 2d
1345, 1347 (Or. App. 1973); Allen v. City of Corpus Christi, 247 S.W. 2d 130 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1952 ). Because zoning ordinances "are in derogation of a property owner's
common law right to unrestricted use of his or her property, provisions therein
restricting property uses should be strictly construed, and provisions permitting
property uses should be liberally construed in favor of the property owner." Brown v.
Sandy City Board ofAdjustment, 957 P. 2d 207, 210 (Utah App. 1998) {quoting Patterson v.
Utah County Board of Adjustment, 893 P. 2d 602, 606 (Utah App. 1995). Further, the

right of a property owner to the continued existence of uses and structures which
lawfully existed prior to the effective date of a zoning restriction is grounded in
constitutional law. 8A McQuillin Municipal Corporations Sec. 25.180-25-180.20, at
8-9 (3d ed. 1994)

The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution and

Article I Section 7 of the Constitution of Utah provide that no person shall be
deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law. Therefore, due
process principles protect a property owner from having his or her vested property
rights interfered with, and preexisting lawful uses of property are generally considered
to be vested rights that zoning ordinances may not abrogate.

8A McQuillan

Municipal Corporations Sec 15.180.20, at 10.
As a general rule, a landowner acquires no advantage from a nonconforming
use previously enjoyed where it appears that such use was surreptitiously and
fraudulently effected, or was unlawful at the time the zoning regulation took effect.
Prospect Gardens Convalescent Home, Inc. v. City ofNorwalk, 347 A. 2d 637 (Conn. 1975 );
Dalton v. Van Dien, 339 N.Y.S. 2d 378 (N.Y. 1972 ). However, violations of law
committed by patrons of the landowner are not chargeable to him or to his use of the
land. Ratcliffe v. Morrison, 123 N.Y.S. 2d 831 (1952, Sup.).
Technical irregularities or violations of non-land use related ordinances are
irrelevant to the question of whether a property should be accorded nonconforming
use status. Hugoe vs. Woods Cross City, 379 Utah Adv. Rep. 15 (Utah App. 1999);
Waikiki Marketplace Investment Company vs. Zoning Board of Appeals of the City and County of
Honolulu, 949 P. 2d 183 (Hawaii App. 1997); Mellow v. Board of Adjustment, 565 A. 2d

947 (Del. Super. Ct. 1988), affd 567 A. 2d 422 (Del. Supr. Ct. 1989); City of
Middlesboro Planning Com'n vs. Howard, 551 S.W. 2d 556 (Ky. 1977). 'Lawful use refers
to compliance with previous zoning laws, not to the building codes or other legal
requirements." Waikiki Marketplace Investment Company, supra, at p. 196.
In March, 1996 the Petitioners owned and were using their properties located
at 9255 South Maison Drive, 1875 East Alia Panna Way, 472 East 9400 South and
1456 East Longdale Drive, in Sandy City, as short-term rentals (rentals for periods of
time less than thirty days). The Petitioners discontinued using these properties for
that purpose only because they were served with a Cease and Desist Order on March
26,1996. (R. 28)
Even though the Cease and Desist Order only purported to prohibit the use
of three of the above-described properties (9255 South Maison Drive was not
included in the Order), the Sandy City Board of Adjustment considered all of the
properties when the issue was brought before it and its ruling was clearly intended to
apply to all of the properties. (R. 269)
The issue in the 1996 Board of Adjustment hearing was the admitted use by the
Petitioners of the above-described properties as short-term rentals. Mr. and Mrs.
Collins did not assert that they were not in fact using the properties for that purpose.
Sandy City had made it very clear to Mr. and Mrs. Collins that such use would not be
permitted in Sandy City. (R. 269) Now, however, Sandy City seeks to assert that Mr.
and Mrs. Collins are precluded from asserting a valid non-conforming use for their
properties because they were not actually using the properties as short-term rentals in

1998 when, following the decision of the Utah Court of Appeals in Brown, supra,
Sandy City enacted a moratorium prohibiting short-term rental properties in R-l
zones in Sandy City.
B.

The Petitioners Are Not Required to Show That They Were Actually
Using Their Properties as Short-Term Rentals on the Date That Sandy
City Enacted an Ordinance Prohibiting Such Use.
Section 15-24-2 of the Sandy City Development Code (Add. 4 -5) provides in

pertinent part that:
"Except as hereinafter specified, any use, building, or structure,
lawfully existing at the time of the enactment or subsequent
amendment of this Code, may be continued, even though such
use, building, or structure does not conform with the provisions
of this Code for the district in which it is located." . . .
The foregoing section of the Sandy City Development Code is in conformity
with the Utah Code sec. 10-9-408 (1996) which declares that "a nonconforming use
or structure may be continued."
It is undisputed that the Petitioners, John Collins and June Collins, would
have continued to use their properties as short-term rental units had the cease and
desist order not been served upon them on March 26, 1996. As a general rule,
cessation of a prior non-conforming use due to circumstances beyond the control of
the property owner does not operate as discontinuance or abandonment of such
nonconforming use. See e.g., Ocean Beach vs. Stein, 488 N.Y.S. 2d 239 (N.Y. App. Div.
1985); Andrew vs. King County, 586 P. 2d 509 (Wash. App. 1978); King County vs. High,
219 P. 2d 118 (Wash. 1950).

These cases hold that unauthorized conduct by a

municipality or regulations temporarily preventing the particular use cannot be

construed as an abandonment of the use by the owner. Whether a party discontinues
or abandons a particular use depends upon the intention of the party affected. King
County vs. High, at 119.
Sandy City cannot arguably require a property owner to break the law in order
to establish a nonconforming use. In fact, the ordinance itself (Sec. 15-24-2) provides
that in order to establish a nonconforming use, the use cannot be illegal. (Add. 4 -5 )
The Plaintiffs in this case were clearly entitled to cease using the properties, as
ordered, until the law was clarified by judicial process. The Petitioners' use of their
properties (as alleged by Sandy City and as admitted by John and June Collins in
1996) as short-term rentals prior to the issuance of the Cease and Desist Order by
Sandy City in March, 1996 is sufficient to establish the uses as valid, nonconforming
uses. Warner vs. Clackamas County, 824 P. 2d 423, 424 (Or. App. 1992); Polk County vs.
Martin, 636 P.2d 952, 957 (Or. 1981); Township of Peacock vs. Panetta, 265 N.W. 2d 810,
813 (Mich App. 1978).
The test for the existence of a nonconforming use is whether the use was
lawful at the time the preclusive legislation took effect.

Warner, supra, at 424. The

Utah Court of Appeals in Brown, supra, held that short-term rental use was a lawful
use, not prohibited by the zoning ordinances in effect at the time. 957 P. 2d at 212213. The properties in question in this case were adapted for the specific use of
short-term rentals. They were furnished and equipped by the Petitioners for this
particular purpose and, until ordered to cease by the Respondent, Sandy City, they
were used for this purpose. This use was discontinued temporarily by plaintiffs only

because they were served with a cease and desist order by the defendant Sandy City7
Corporation. The use of the properties as short-term rentals by the Petitioners prior
to the issuance of the Cease and Desist Order (R. 28) was clearly an existing, legal
nonconforming use and the plaintiffs are entitled to have the properties granted prior
nonconforming use status.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, this Court should reverse the Order of the District
Court and order that the Petitioners, John Collins and June Collins, had established a
valid, existing, non-conforming use for their real properties located in Sandy City
prior to the enactment of prohibitive ordinances by Sandy City and that the
Petitioners are allowed to continue the pre-existing, non-conforming use.
Dated this

day of May, 2000.
Respectfully submitted,

Franklin L. Slaugh
Attorney for Petitioners-Appellants
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Chapter 15-24 Sandy City Development Code

4

Third Judicial District
Steven C. Osbora (3669)
Kathleen & Jeffery (1652)
Attorneys for Respondents
10,000 Centennial Parkway
Sandy, Utah 84070
Telephone: (801) 568-7170
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH •*

JOHN COLLINS and JUNE COLLINS
Petitioners,
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
AND ORDER OF DISMISSAL
SANDY CITY BOARD OF
ADJUSTMENT and SANDY CITY
CORPORATION, a municipal
corporation,

:

Case no. 980912601

Judge Timothy R Hanson
Respondents.

This matter came before the above-entitled court on oral argument on August"1671999
before the Honorable Timothy R. Hanson on cross motions for summary judgment made on
behalf of Petitioners and Respondents. Petitioners were represented by Franklin L. Slaugh;
Respondents were represented by Steven C. Osbora.
Based upon the memoranda, arguments, and exhibits submitted by the parties,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED:

1. There is no issue of material fact in this matter, and judgment can be issued as a matter
of law for the reasons set out in the memoranda and oral argument of Respondents.
2. Petitioners have not borne their burden to demonstrate that they are entitled a
nonconforming use for any of the three subject properties. The Board of Adjustment decision
was not arbitrary, capricious or illegal, and was supported by substantial evidence.
3. The Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted and Petitioners' Motion
for Summary Judgment is denied in respect to Petitioners' property at 1875 East Alia Panna Way
in Sandy based on the doctrine of issue preclusion, due to Petitioners1 noHiaving appealed the
trial court's decision in Third District Court case number 960905929CV, and for the following
reasons: the home was not used as a short-term rental (less than 30 days) on March 27,1998, the
effective date of the new ordinance prohibiting such use because Petitioners were complying with
the City's earlier cease and desist order; and because Petitioners failed to carry their burden of
demonstrating that when the property was used as a short-term rental; the Petitioners did not
submit any evidence to show that the use was in conformity with the City's ordinances requiring
that the use of properties in single family zones be by a "family" as that term is defined in the
Sandy City ordinances.
4. The Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted and Petitioners' Motion
for Summary Judgment is denied in respect to Petitioners' property at 472 East 9400 South in
Sandy based on the doctrine of issue preclusion, due to Petitioners1 not having appealed the trial
court's decision in Third District Court case number 960905929CV, and for the following
reasons: the home was not used as a short-term rental (less than 30 days) on March 27, 1998,
the effective date of the new ordinance because Petitioners were complying with the City's earlier
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cease and desist order; and because Petitioners failed to cany their burden of demonstrating that
when the property was used as a short-term rental, the Petitioners did not submit any evidence to
show that the use was in conformity with the City's ordinances requiring that the use of properties
in single family zones be by a "family" as that term is defined in the Sandy City ordinances.
5. The Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted and Petitioners' Motion
for Summary Judgment is denied in respect to Petitioners' property at 9255 Maison Drive in
Sandy based on the doctrine of issue preclusion, due to Petitioners1 not having appealed the
1996 Board of Adjustment decision case number 96-31 to Third District Court, and for the
following reasons: the home was not used as a short-term rental on March 27,1998,' the eflfective
date of the new ordinance, nor was there evidence submitted that the property was ever used as a
short-term rental.
6. The Petition for Review is hereby dismissed, with prejudice and upon the merits, no
cause of action.

Ahn)

DATED this _££_
day ofOetobfr, 1999
&
BYTHEC0URT:

TIMOTHY R. HANSON ' -'
District Court Judge ^C '"
u*-*"r

APPROVED AS TO FORM:

FRANKLIN L. SLAUGH
Attorney for Petitioners
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NONCONFORMING USES & STRUCTURES
CHAPTER 15-24 NONCONFORMING USES AND
STRUCTURES
15-24-1
15-24-2
15-24-3
15-24-4

Purpose of Nonconforming Use Provisions
Continuing Existing Uses
Construction Approved Prior to Ordinance
Nonconforming Uses, Substitution, Extension,
Discontinuance, Etc.

15-24-1 Purpose Of Nonconforming Use Provisions
It is the purpose of these regulations to control and
gradually eliminate those uses of land or buildings, which
although legal at the time of their establishment, do not
now conform to the use regulations of the district within
which they are situated. Such uses shall be deemed
nonconforming uses. Likewise, these regulations are
intended to control and gradually eliminate buildings
which, although legal at the time of their erection, do not
now conform to the height, bulk, and location regulations
of the zone district within which they are situated. Such
buildings shall be deemed to be nonconforming buildings.
Any building or use which was permitted prior to enactment of this Code, but which is designated by this Code
as a conditional use, shall not be considered
nonconforming and shall not be subject to the provisions
of this Chapter. This Chapter is also established to
control and gradually eliminate sites and lots which were
legal at the time of their establishment but no longer meet
the regulations of the district within which they are
located. Such sites and lots shall be designated as
nonconforming sites and lots.
15-24-2 Continuing Existing Uses
Except as hereinafter specified, any use, building, or
structure, lawfully existing at the time of the enactment or
subsequent amendment of this Code, may be continued,
even though such use, building, or structure does not
conform with the provisions of this Code for the district in
which it is located. Except as otherwise provided by law,
nothing in this Code shall prevent the strengthening or
restoring to a safe condition of any part of any building or
structure declared unsafe by proper authority.

15-24-3 Construction Approved Prior To Ordinance
A building, structure, or part thereof which does not
conform to the regulations of the district in which it is
situated, but for which a building permit was legally issued
and construction started prior to the enactment of this
Code, may be completed in accordance with such plans
providing work has progressed continuously and without
delay. Such building or structure shall be deemed to be

nonconforming and shall be subject to the regulations set
forth herein.
15-24-4 Nonconforming Uses, Substitution, Extension, Discontinuance, Etc.
Unless otherwise approved by the Board of Adjustment,
a nonconforming use shall not be enlarged, extended, or
changed unless the use is changed to a use permitted in
the district in which it is located, and a nonconforming
building shall not be reconstructed or structurally altered
unless such alteration shall result in removing those
conditions of the building which render it nonconforming,
except as follows:
(a) Substitution or Extension.
(1) When authorized by the Board of Adjustment in accordance with this Code, a
nonconforming use which is determined to be of a
more desirable nature may be substituted for another
nonconforming use or more closely meets the
standards set forth in this code.
(2) Whenever a nonconforming use has been
changed to a conforming use such use shall not
thereafter be changed to a nonconforming use.
(3) Repairs and structural alterations may be
made to a nonconforming building provided that the
floor space of such building is not increased. (Refer
also to requirements of Chapter 22, Site Plan
Review.)
(4) A building or structure lacking sufficient
automobile parking space in connection therewith as
required by this ordinance may be altered or
enlarged provided additional automobile parking
space is supplied to meet the requirements of this
ordinance for such alterations or enlargement.
(5) In the event a nonconforming building or
structure is damaged or partially destroyed by
calamity or act of nature to the extent of not more
than one-half (!4) of its market value, the occupancy
or use of such building structure or part thereof which
existed at the time of such partial destruction may be
continued or resumed provided that restoration is
started within a period of one year and is diligently
pursued to completion. In the event such damage or
destruction exceeds one-half (Vi) of its market value
of such nonconforming building or structure, no
repairs or reconstruction shall be made, except in the
case of residences or accessory farm buildings,
unless every portion of such building or structure is
made to conform to all regulations for new buildings
in the district in which it is located, as determined by
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the Chief Building Official, and other requirements as
may be imposed at site plan review.
(6) Application for substitution, enlargement or
extension of a nonconforming use as provided in this
Section shall be made and considered in the manner
set forth in Chapter 15-5, Board of Adjustment
(7) A vacant building or structure may be
occupied by a use for which the building or structure
is designed or intended if so occupied within a period
of one year after the use became nonconforming.

(b) Cessation of Use. A use shall be deemed to
have ceased when it has been discontinued for a period
of one year or more, whether or not the intent is to
abandon said use.
(c) Nonconforming Lot. (See Section 15-5-3H)

